Competing manufacturers, who sell their products through retailers, may face the strategic distribution channel design question of whether to establish an "store-within-store" channel or not. With consider of the role of sales effort, we analyze the manufacturer channel strategies. Two cases are considered: competing manufacturer and competing retailer. We built four game models corresponding to four channel strategies, and discussed the influence of manufacture's bargaining power coefficient, prices competition intensity, and sales effort competition intensity on manufactures' channel strategies.
Introduction
Now, the competition form between enterprises gradually evolved into supply chain competition. When supply chains compete on demand, whether enterprises can develop the market and achieve sales and management goals depend on their channel strategies. Especially, "store-within-store" channel is common in realistic, and is a kind of business model that sales products in particular area of a market, which has comprehensive advantages in operation management, customer flow and so on. This business model can take advantages of partners, reduce marketing costs, and break through traditional restrictions on developing the market. At the same time, when enterprises compete on demand, non-price factors such as sales effort level also plays an important role. For example, sales effort, such as laying products on conspicuous shelves, training sales staff, increasing advertising investment, can increase demand. However, if the retailer bears the costs of sales effort alone, it may select the sales effort level which is only good for itself, but may be not good for the manufacture. Thus, manufacture should consider not only how to select channel, but also how to design contract that can stimulate retailer to improve its sales effort behaviors to increase demand and profit and to build a good relationship with the retailer.
The setting of this paper relates to the work on chain-to-chain competition and contract. Zhao and Shi (2011) consider two competing supply chains, which multiple upstream suppliers produce complementary products and sell to a single buyer. Edirisinghe et al. (2011) investigate the implications of channel power on supply chain stability in a setting where multiple suppliers sell substitutable products through a common retailer. Ha et al.(2011) assume imperfect demand signals, production diseconomy, and both Cournot and Bertrand competition with differentiated products. Ai et al. (2012) demonstrate the impact of demand uncertainty and retailers' forecasting precision on contract decisions of the manufacturers in two competing supply chains. Li et al. (2013) explore the effect of supply chain structure and competition at both manufacturer and retailer levels on contract choices of two competing supply chains. Gao et al. (2016) explore the influence of different channel power structures on the optimal decisions and performance of a closed-loop supply chain. Ke and Liu (2017) analyze the dual-channel supply chain in centralized and decentralized cases, and give closed-form expressions for equilibriums in the two cases.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model assumption. Section 3 establishes and explores the sub-game solution. Section 4 presents the equilibrium result. Finally, we summarize the paper, and suggest research extensions in Section 5.
Assumption
Consider a market consisting of two manufacturers (Mi, i=1,2) and two retailers (Rj, j=1,2). Two manufacturers (M1 and M2) produce substitute product and sale them through exclusive retailers (R1 and R2). Two manufactures decide whether to select "store-within-store" channel (denoted by S) or traditional distributor channel (denoted by D) at the same time. Therefore there are four structures (SS, DD, SD, and DS). And SS stands for both manufactures select "store-within-store" channels, DD stands for both manufactures select traditional distributor channels, SD or DS stands for one manufacture selects "store-within-store" channel and the other selects traditional distributor channel.
Model
We built four game models corresponding to four structures (SS, DD, SD, and DS), and discussed each supply chain member's equilibrium decision in each structure. These models study two levels of competition : manufactures level and retailer level. Firstly, we analyse the competition in manufactures level, and assumed demands only influenced by product prices.We built the following demand equation: =1, two products can completely substitute each other, and the competition between two supply chains is extremely fierce.
DD Structure
Under this circumstance, both manufactures select traditional distributor channels. Manufactures set wholesale prices at first, and retailers give optimal responds to the given wholesale prices. When wholesale prices of manufactures are given, retailers can decide the optimal retail prices according to the following equation:
where MDD stands for DD structure that considers competition between manufactures. By the first order condition, we get (4) According to equilibrium wholesale prices, we can get retail prices, demands, profit functions of retailers and manufactures in all supply chains in MDD structure.
SS Structure
Under this circumstance, both manufactures select "store-within-store" channels. Manufactures sale products and set retail prices. While retailers collect rents （Fi） as profits. Manufactures' optimization decisions on are as below:
By the first order condition, we can get equilibrium retail prices
According to equilibrium retail prices and Nash bargaining model, we can get the optimal rents:
Then, we can get 
SD/DS Structure
Under these circumstances, one manufacture selects traditional distributor channel (denoted by SC1)and the other selects "store-within-store" channel (denoted by SC2). Taking DS Structure as an example, we can get equilibrium solutions as follow: 
The role of sales effort on manufacturer's channel strategies
In this part, we studied the equilibrium channels in manufacturers competition situation and retailers competition situation, and we deeply analyzed influence of manufacturers' prices competition and retailers' sales effort levels competition on profit and the equilibrium channels. We identified traditional distributor channel and "store-within-store" channel should be chosen in which conditions. We assumed
The result of competing manufacturers
To express conveniently, we defined the following functions:
Obviously, whether all of the function
positive or negative depend on manufacturers prices competition intensity and manufacturers barraging power. We further defined following 4 sets: 
In area A1, two manufactures had better select DD structure, thus DD is not only the unique equilibrium of two manufactures, but also the best selections for them. In area A2, DS/SD structure is the equilibrium of two manufactures. In area A3, SS structure is inferior to DD structure, thus SS structure is only the unique equilibrium of two manufactures, while not the best selections for them. So in this area, two manufactures may fall into prisoners' dilemma if they select SS structure. In area A4 , SS structure is not only the unique equilibrium of two manufactures, but also the best selections for them. From the above observation, we can get the following enlightenment, when the bargaining power of manufactures are poor, DD structure (i.e. two manufactures select traditional distributor channels) is the best selection; when the bargaining power of manufactures are strong, SS strategy (i.e. two manufactures select "store-within-store" channel) is the equilibrium. However, this structure may
